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Abstract
Zero-Knowledge PCPs (ZK-PCPs; Kilian, Petrank, and Tardos, STOC ‘97) are PCPs with the
additional zero-knowledge guarantee that the view of any (possibly malicious) verifier making a
bounded number of queries to the proof can be efficiently simulated up to a small statistical distance.
Similarly, ZK-PCPs of Proximity (ZK-PCPPs; Ishai and Weiss, TCC ‘14) are PCPPs in which the
view of an adversarial verifier can be efficiently simulated with few queries to the input.
Previous ZK-PCP constructions obtained an exponential gap between the query complexity q of
the honest verifier, and the bound q∗ on the queries of a malicious verifier (i.e., q = poly log (q∗)),
but required either exponential-time simulation, or adaptive honest verification. This should be
contrasted with standard PCPs, that can be verified non-adaptively (i.e., with a single round of
queries to the proof). The problem of constructing such ZK-PCPs, even when q∗ = q, has remained
open since they were first introduced more than 2 decades ago. This question is also open for
ZK-PCPPs, for which no construction with non-adaptive honest verification is known (not even with
exponential-time simulation).
We resolve this question by constructing the first ZK-PCPs and ZK-PCPPs which simultaneously
achieve efficient zero-knowledge simulation and non-adaptive honest verification. Our schemes have




where n is the input length.
Our constructions combine the “MPC-in-the-head” technique (Ishai et al., STOC ‘07) with
leakage-resilient secret sharing. Specifically, we use the MPC-in-the-head technique to construct a
ZK-PCP variant over a large alphabet, then employ leakage-resilient secret sharing to design a new
alphabet reduction for ZK-PCPs which preserves zero-knowledge.
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1 Introduction
Probabilistically Checkable Proofs (PCPs) [2, 3] allow a probabilistic verifier to check the
validity of a given statement by only querying few proof bits. Zero-Knowledge (ZK) proofs [18]
allow a prover to convince a verifier of the validity of a statement, without revealing any
additional information to the verifier. This work focuss on Zero-Knowledge Probabilistically
Checkable Proofs (ZK-PCPs) (and ZK-PCPs of proximity), which combine the advantages of
these two types of proof systems. Before describing our main results, we first give a short
overview of these proof systems.
Probabilistically Checkable Proofs (PCPs)
PCPs [2, 3] allow a randomized efficient verifier V with oracle access to a purported proof
π to verify an NP-statement of the form “x ∈ L” by reading only few bits of π. The proof
can be efficiently generated given the NP witness, and the verifier accepts true claims with
probability 1, whereas false claims are accepted with low probability (which is called the
soundness error). The celebrated PCP theorem [2, 3, 15] states that any NP language has
a PCP system with soundness error 1/2, in which the verifier reads only O (1) bits from
a polynomial-length proof (soundness can be amplified through repetition). An attractive
feature of these PCP systems is that the verifier is non-adaptive, namely it makes a single
round of queries to the proof. PCPs of Proximity (PCPPs) [16, 6, 15] are a generalization
of PCPs in which the verifier does not read its entire input. Instead, V has oracle access
to x, π, and wishes to check whether x is close to L (in relative Hamming distance). The
best PCPP constructions for NP [7, 27] obtain comparable parameters to the PCP systems
described above, where any x which is δ-far from L in relative Hamming distance is rejected
with high probability, and δ is a constant or even inverse polylogarithmic (δ is called the
proximity parameter).
Zero-Knowledge (ZK) proofs
ZK proofs [18] allow a randomized efficient prover to prove an NP-statement of the form
“x ∈ L” to a randomized efficient verifier, while guaranteeing that true claims are accepted
with probability 1, false claims are rejected with high probability, and the verifier learns
no information about the corresponding NP-witness. This last property, known as zero-
knowledge, is formalized by requiring that for any (possibly malicious) efficient verifier V∗,
there exists an efficient simulator machine that has access only to the statement x, and can
simulate the interaction of V∗ with the honest prover.
Zero-Knowledge PCPs (ZK-PCPs)
ZK-PCPs [26] combine the attractive features of PCPs and ZK proofs. Specifically, ZK-PCPs
are PCPs in which the prover P is randomized, and the proof π has the following zero-
knowledge guarantee: the view of every (possibly malicious, possibly unbounded) verifier V∗
that makes an a-priori bounded number of queries to the proof, can be efficiently simulated
up to a small statistical distance. We remark that restricting V∗ to making an a-priori
bounded number of queries is inherent to obtaining ZK with polynomial-length proofs.
The first ZK-PCP constructions for NP [26, 22] obtain ZK against any verifier V∗ that is
restricted to querying at most q∗ = q∗ (|x|) proof bits, with proofs of length poly (q∗) that
can be verified with polylog(q∗) queries and have a negligible soundness error. In particular,
the query gap q∗/q – the ratio between the query complexities of the malicious and honest
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verifiers – obtained by these constructions is exponential.1 Unfortunately, obtaining ZK
in [26, 22] did not come without a cost: it required the honest verifier to be adaptive, namely
to make several rounds of queries to the proof (where the queries of each round depend on
the answers to previous queries). In cryptographic applications of ZK-PCPs (e.g., in [25])
this blows-up the round complexity of resultant protocols. In particular, every round of
queries which the verifier makes to the ZK-PCP induces two communication rounds in the
interactive protocols which rely on ZK-PCPs.
Ishai and Weiss [24] introduce the notion of Zero-Knowledge PCPPs (ZK-PCPPs). Similar
to ZK-PCPs, the ZK-PCPP prover is randomized, and zero-knowledge means that the view
of any verifier V∗ making q∗ queries to the input and the proof can be efficiently simulated,
up to a small statistical distance, by making only q∗ queries to the input. They use similar
techniques to [26, 22] to obtain ZK-PCPPs for NP with comparable parameters to the
ZK-PCPs of [26, 22], where the proximity parameter δ is constant or inverse polylogarithmic.
These ZK-PCPPs also require adaptive verification, which increases the round complexity in
their cryptographic applications [24, 30].
As discussed in Sections 2.1.4 and 2.2.2 below, adaptive verification is in fact inherent
to the constructions of [26, 22, 24]. Indeed, these schemes are obtained by combining a
PCP or PCPP with a weak zero-knowledge guarantee that only holds against the honest
verifier, with an information-theoretic commitment primitive called locking schemes [26].
This latter primitive requires adaptive opening, which causes the resultant ZK-PCP verifier
to be adaptive.
Can ZK-PCPs be verified non-adaptively?
Motivated by the goal of obtaining ZK for PCPs at no additional cost, Ishai et al. [25] gave a
partial answer to this question. Specifically, they construct ZK-PCPs with similar parameters
to the schemes of [26, 22] in which the honest verifier is non-adaptive, but with a weaker
zero-knowledge guarantee compared to standard ZK-PCPs: the zero-knowledge simulator is
inefficient (this is also known as witness-indistinguishability). Alternatively, they obtain ZK
with efficient simulation against computationally-bounded verifiers, assuming the existence of
one-way functions and a common random string. The techniques of [25] diverge from the
standard method of designing ZK-PCPs [26, 22] discussed above. Specifically, the ZK-PCP
of [25] is based on a novel connection to leakage-resilient circuits, which are circuits that
operate over encoded inputs, and resist certain “side channel” attacks in the sense that such
attacks reveal nothing about the input other than the output. Unfortunately, the weaker ZK
guarantee of the ZK-PCPs of [25] carries over to any application in which these systems are
used. Moreover, [25] give evidence that inefficient simulation is inherent to their technique of
using leakage-resilient circuits.
Non-adaptive honest vs. malicious verification
It is instructive to note that while having non-adaptive (honest) verification is a feature
of the system (since it guarantees that the honest verifier can achieve soundness with a
single round of queries), having zero-knowledge against non-adaptive malicious verifiers is a
restriction of the system, since there is no ZK guarantee against adaptive malicious verifiers,
that make several rounds of queries to the proof.
1 We stress that a larger gap is preferable to a smaller one, since it means the proof can be verified with
few queries, while guaranteeing zero-knowledge even when a malicious verifier makes many more queries
(compared to the honest verifier).
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We note that in [25], leakage-resilient circuits fall short of yielding ZK-PCPs with full-
fledged zero-knowledge not only because the simulation is inefficient, but also because
zero-knowledge holds only against non-adaptive (malicious) verifiers. Ishai et al. [25] obtain
ZK (with inefficient simulation) against adaptive verifiers by combining leakage-resilient
circuits with techniques of [9]. These techniques incur an exponential blowup in the complexity
of the ZK simulator, but did not pose a problem for [25] since their simulator (even against
non-adaptive malicious verifiers) was already inefficient.
The current landscape of ZK-PCPs is unsatisfying. Current ZK-PCP constructions either
require adaptive verification [26, 22], or guarantee only a weak form of ZK with an inefficient
simulator [25]. This holds regardless of the query gap, i.e., even if we restrict malicious
verifiers to making the same number of queries as the honest verifier. For ZK-PCPPs, the
situation is even worse: no constructions with non-adaptive verification are known (not even
with inefficient simulation). This state of affairs gives rise to the following natural question:
Do there exist ZK-PCPs (and ZK-PCPPs) with non-adaptive verification and efficient
simulation?
As we discuss in Sections 2.1.4 and 2.2.2 below, the limitations of existing ZK-PCP and
ZK-PCPP constructions seem to be inherent to the respective techniques they employ to
obtain ZK. This seems to imply that obtaining both non-adaptive verification and efficient
simulation requires new techniques. Or maybe such objects do not even exist?
1.1 Our results
In this work, we answer our research question in the affirmative: we construct ZK-PCPs and
ZK-PCPPs that can be verified non-adaptively and have efficient zero-knowledge simulation.
Unlike the schemes of [26, 22, 24, 25], which obtain an exponential gap between the query
complexities of the malicious and honest verifiers, we are only able to obtain a polynomial
query gap (q∗ vs. (q∗)ϵ, for some constant ϵ ∈ (0, 1)).
In the following, we say that a PCP (PCPP, resp.) system is a non-adaptive q-query
q∗-ZK-PCP (q∗-ZK-PCPP, resp.) if it is perfectly ZK against a (possibly malicious, possibly
adaptive) verifier making q∗ queries, and achieves a negl (q∗) soundness error where the
honest verifier makes q non-adaptive queries to the proof.
Specifically, we obtain the following results:
▶ Theorem 1 (Non-Adaptive ZK-PCPs with Efficient Simulation). There exists a constant
ϵ ∈ (0, 1) such that for any ZK parameter q∗ ∈ N there exists a non-adaptive (q∗)ϵ-query
Ω (q∗)-ZK-PCP for NP.
▶ Theorem 2 (Non-Adaptive ZK-PCPPs with Efficient Simulation). Let n ∈ N be an input
length parameter. Then there exists a constant c > 0 such that for any proximity parameter
δ ≥ 1/
√
n, there exists a non-adaptive q-query q∗-ZK-PCPP for NP with proximity parameter









Our non-adaptive ZK-PCPs and ZK-PCPPs can be plugged-into the applications described
in [24, 25, 30], and will reduce the round complexity of the resultant protocols.2
2 In this context, we note that if one only requires ZK against the honest verifier, then non-adaptive
ZK-PCPs and ZK-PCPPs are known. (This is implicit in [26] and [24] for ZK-PCPs and ZK-PCPPs
respectively, via standard soundness amplification.) Consequently, our non-adaptive ZK-PCPs and ZK-
PCPPs (with ZK against malicious verifiers) do not improve the round complexity in applications that
only require ZK against the honest-verifier (e.g., the ZK arguments of [22], and the commit-and-prove
protocols of [24]).
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Our constructions show that leakage-resilience techniques can be used to construct ZK-
PCPs (and ZK-PCPPs) with both non-adaptive (honest) verification and efficient simulation.
Specifically, we circumvent the negative result of [25] on the limitations of using leakage-
resilient circuits, by relying on leakage-resilient secret sharing [17, 12] secure against local
leakage [19, 8, 1]. Compared to leakage-resilient circuits, leakage-resilient secret sharing has
the weaker guarantee of only protecting information from leakage, whereas leakage-resilient
circuits also protect computation. However, this weaker guarantee suffices for our needs, and
admits leaner and more efficient constructions compared to those of leakage-resilient circuits
(and applications using them). Specifically, we use leakage resilient secret sharing to design
a new alphabet reduction procedure that transforms a ZK-PCP over a large alphabet to a
ZK-PCP over bits, while preserving zero-knowledge.
2 Our Techniques
We now give more details about our ZK-PCP and ZK-PCPP constructions.
2.1 ZK-PCPs with Non-Adaptive Verification and Efficient Simulation
Our starting point is a ZK-PCP implicit in the work of [21]. They use secure Multi-Party
Computation (MPC) protocols to construct a ZK-PCP variant over a large (poly-sized)
alphabet with efficient ZK simulation, that can be verified non-adaptively. Their ZK-PCP
suffers from two disadvantages. First, strictly speaking it is not a ZK-PCP, since in standard
ZK-PCPs the proof is a bit string, whereas the ZK-PCP of [21] is over a large alphabet.
Second, their construction has no query gap, namely the proof is ZK against verifiers querying
q∗ proof symbols, but to get soundness the honest verifier must also make q∗ queries.
2.1.1 Amplifying the Query Gap in the ZK-PCP of [21]
To prove that x ∈ L for some NP-language L with a corresponding NP relation R = R (x, w),
Ishai et al. [21] employ an n-party protocol that computes the function fR (x, w1, . . . , wn) =
R (x,⊕wi), where x is a common input, and wi is the input of the ith party Pi. The prover
executes the MPC protocol “in its head”, obtaining the views of all parties P1, . . . , Pn in
the execution (the view of party Pi consists of its input, random input, and all messages it
received during the execution). The proof consists of all these views, where each view is a
symbol in the resultant proof. To verify the proof, the verifier reads several views, and checks
that: (1) the output reported in all views is 1; and (2) the views are consistent, namely for
every pair Vi, Vj of queried views of Pi, Pj (respectively), the incoming messages from Pi
reported in Vj are the messages Pi would send in the protocol given its view Vi, and vice
versa.
To get q∗-ZK, the protocol should be private against q∗ (semi-honest) parties, in the
sense that they learn nothing from the execution except their inputs and the output. For
soundness, [21] rely on a notion of correctness against q∗ corrupted parties (known as
robustness), guaranteeing that even if q∗ parties arbitrarily deviate from the protocol, they
cannot cause an honest party to output 1 in a protocol execution on x /∈ L. We revisit their
analysis, and show that general MPC protocols yield a square root query gap. That is, given
a q∗-private and q∗-robust MPC protocol, the resultant ZK-PCP over a large alphabet is ZK
against a (possibly malicious) verifier querying q∗ proof symbols, and can be non-adaptively
verified with only
√
q∗ queries, with a negligible soundness error. This already yields a
non-trivial ZK-PCP over a large alphabet. Our tighter analysis can be found in the full
version [20].
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2.1.2 Alphabet Reduction for ZK-PCPs
Next, we address the fact that the ZK-PCP of [21] is over a large alphabet. For standard
PCPs, one can easily reduce the alphabet Σ over which the proof π is defined to {0, 1} by
simply replacing each alphabet symbol with a bit string, thus obtaining a new proof π′ over
{0, 1}. This would increase the proof length and the query complexity of the honest verifier
by a multiplicative log |Σ| factor, but would not otherwise affect the system.3
Unfortunately, applying this transformation to zero-knowledge PCPs might render the
resultant scheme totally insecure. Indeed, while the system would still be ZK against verifiers
making q∗ queries, the query gap now reduces since the query complexity of the honest
verifier (i.e., the number of queries it must make to obtain soundness) increases. Specifically,
depending of |Σ|, the honest verifier might now need to make > q∗ queries, but π′ might not
be ZK even against q∗ + 1 malicious queries. As a result, π′ might not be ZK even against
malicious verifiers that make fewer queries than the honest verifier! Indeed, a malicious
verifier V∗ with oracle access to π′ is not restricted to querying “whole” symbols of π, i.e.,
reading the entire substring of π′ that corresponds to a symbol of π. On the contrary,
V∗ might read “parts” of symbols, thus potentially gaining (partial) information on q∗ + 1
symbols of π, and possibly violating the ZK guarantee of the original system.
The trivial alphabet reduction for PCPs described above fails because querying even a
single bit in the bit string sσ representing a symbol σ ∈ Σ might reveal information about σ.
Therefore, to make this alphabet reduction work for zero-knowledge PCPs, we must guarantee
that querying few bits of sσ reveals nothing about σ. We do so using leakage-resilient
secret sharing.
At a high level, a (t-threshold) Secret Sharing Scheme (SSS) is a method of distributing
a secret s among n parties by giving each party Pi a share Shi, such that any t shares reveal
no information about s, but any t + 1 shares completely determine s. A Leakage-Resilient
Secret Sharing Scheme (LR-SSS) against local leakage [19, 8, 1] has the added feature of
resisting leakage on the shares, in the following sense. The secret s remains hidden given t
shares, as well as few leakage bits computed separately on every other share.
Given a ZK-PCP system (P,V) over a large alphabet Σ, and a LR-SSS for secrets in
{0, 1}log|Σ|, our alphabet reduction works as follows. The prover P ′ uses P to generate a
proof π = σ1 . . . σN over Σ, replaces every σi with its bit-representation sσi , which it secret
shares using the LR-SSS. The proof π′ consists of the secret sharings of sσ1 , . . . , sσN . To
verify the proof, the verifier V ′ emulates V, where a query Q of V to its proof π is answered
as follows. V ′ uses the secret sharing of sσQ (from its own proof oracle π′) to reconstruct σQ,
which it then provides to V.4
The PCP system obtained through the reduction preserves the completeness and soundness
of (P,V), and guarantees ZK against non-adaptive (possibly malicious) verifiers that are
restricted to making (roughly) q∗∗ = q∗ℓt queries to the proof, where (P,V) is ZK against
verifiers querying q∗ proof symbols, and the LR-SSS is private against any t shares as well as
ℓ leakage bits from every other share.
3 We note that several PCP constructions (e.g. [15]) use more elaborate alphabet reduction techniques
for efficiency reasons (in particular, their goal is to achieve quasi-linear length proofs with O (1) query
complexity and a constant soundness error). A log |Σ| blowup is less significant in the context of
zero-knowledge PCPs, where the query complexity is anyway ω (1) since we wish to have a negligible
soundness error.
4 Due to some technical issues, the construction is actually somewhat more involved, see Section 4 and
the full version [20] for the construction and further details.
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To see why ZK holds, we split the proof π′ into N “sections”, where the ith section
contains the secret sharing of sσi , and sσi is the bit-representation of the ith symbol σi of
the original proof π. Roughly (and somewhat inaccurately), the queries of any non-adaptive
(possibly malicious) verifier V∗ querying at most q∗∗ proof bits divide the sections of π′ into
two groups.
1. “Light” sections, from which V∗ reads at most ℓt bits. In particular, for each such section
containing the secret shares Sh1, . . . , Shn of the bit-representation sσ of a symbol σ, there
can be at most t shares from which V∗ reads more than ℓ bits, and each other share is
queried only ℓ times. Therefore, the leakage-resilience of the LR-SSS guarantees that sσ
(and consequently also σ) remains entirely hidden.
2. “Heavy” sections, from which V∗ queries more than ℓt bits. Notice that there can only be
at most q∗ such sections, and V∗ obtains no information about the symbols of π encoded
in “light” sections, so the queries to the “heavy” sections can be simulated by the ZK of
(P,V).
(The full – and accurate – analysis appears in the proof of Theorem 18, which can be found
in the full version [20].)
In summary, combining a ZK-PCP over a large alphabet with a SSS that resists probing
leakage, we obtain a ZK-PCP over {0, 1}. Instantiating the transformation with the ZK-PCP
of [21] (with our improved analysis) together with the LR-SSS of [29] yields a ZK-PCP with
the parameters of Theorem 1that is ZK against (possibly malicious and unbounded) verifiers
that only make non-adaptive queries to their proof oracle.
2.1.3 Amplifying to ZK Against Adaptive Verifiers
The analysis of our alphabet reduction for ZK-PCPs crucially relied on the fact that the
malicious verifier V∗ was non-adaptive. Indeed, the queries to “light” and “heavy” sections
are simulated differently (using the LR-simulator of the LR-SSS, and the ZK-simulator of
(P,V), respectively), meaning the simulator for (P ′,V ′) needs to know at the onset of the
simulation which sections are “heavy” and which are “light”. Obtaining ZK against adaptive
verifiers seems to require a stronger leakage-resilience guarantee with a two-phase flavor
similar to the locking schemes of [26, 22]. Specifically, in the first phase of the simulation,
the LR-simulator SimLR should be able to answer adaptive leakage queries as in a standard
(adaptively-secure) LR-SSS. However, unlike standard LR-SSSs, at some point the simulation
may move to a second phase. In the second phase the simulator SimLR is given a secret s,
and should be able to “explain” s by providing an entire secret sharing of s which is random
subject to being consistent with the previously-simulated answers to leakage queries. We
formalize this notion, introducing equivocal SSSs as a generalization of standard LR-SSSs,
and provide a construction based on codes with leakage-resilience guarantees (see Section 2.3
for further details).
Applying our alphabet reduction to (P,V) and an equivocal SSS now yields a ZK-PCP
with ZK against any – possibly malicious and adaptive – verifier V∗ making at most q∗∗
queries. Indeed, the ZK-PCP simulator Sim starts the simulation by answering all queries
using the LR-simulator SimLR of the equivocal SSS. Whenever the number of queries to a
certain proof section passes some threshold, Sim uses the ZK-simulator SimZK to simulate
the underlying symbol σ of π. Then, Sim provides the bit-representation of σ to SimLR as
the secret-shared secret. The equivocation property of the SSS guarantees that SimLR can
now “explain” this secret by providing an entire secret sharing which is consistent with the
previous leakage. These secret shares can be used to answer any further queries to that
section of the proof. The construction appears in Section 4.1, and the analysis can be found
in the full version [20].
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To sum up, combining a ZK-PCP over a large alphabet with an equivocal SSS against
probing leakage yields a ZK-PCP over {0, 1}, where zero-knowledge holds against adaptive
verifiers. Instantiating the transformation with the ZK-PCP of [21] and the equivocal scheme
described in section 2.3.2 yields a ZK-PCP with the parameters of Theorem 1.
2.1.4 Why Do Previous Approaches of Constructing Non-Adaptive
ZK-PCPs Fail?
It is instructive to discuss why our approach of combining alphabet reduction with LR secret
sharing succeeds in simultaneously obtaining non-adaptive verification and efficient simulation,
whereas previous approaches [26, 22, 25] could only achieve one of these properties.
As noted above, the ZK-PCPs of [26, 22] are obtained by combining PCPs that are ZK
against the honest verifier with locking schemes. In effect, the locking schemes are used
to “force” the queries of a malicious verifier to be distributed (almost) as the queries of
the honest verifier. This transformation causes adaptive verification due to two reasons:
first, the original proof is altered in such a way that necessitates adaptive queries to verify
it. Second, the locking schemes themselves require adaptive opening. We are faced with a
similar challenge, where the queries of the malicious verifier might drastically deviate from
those of an honest verifier (namely, V∗ might query “parts” of symbols, whereas the honest
verifier always queries whole symbols). However, instead of “forcing” the queries of V∗ to
“look” honest, we allow V∗ to make any set of queries, but guarantee that queries to “parts”
of symbols reveal no information on the underlying symbol.
The ZK-PCP of [25] uses a different approach. Their starting point is a non-ZK PCP,
and they use leakage-resilient circuits to protect the entire PCP generation. That is, the
queries of the verifier are interpreted as leakage on the process of generating the PCP from
the NP-witness, and by protecting this entire computation from leakage, they obtain ZK.
More specifically, they change the NP statement which is being verified: instead of verifying
that (x, w) is a satisfying input for the verification circuit C of the NP-relation R, the honest
verifier checks whether the leakage-resilient version Ĉ of C is satisfiable. Therefore, soundness
of the resultant ZK-PCP system crucially relies on the fact that if there exists no w such
that C (x, w) = 1, then there exists no w′ such that Ĉ (x, w′) = 1,5 a notion which they call
SAT-respecting. Ishai et al. [25] give evidence that SAT-respecting leakage-resilient circuits
with efficient LR-simulation (for the leakage classes needed to construct ZK-PCPs) exist
only for languages in BPP. The inefficient LR-simulation is the cause of ZK with inefficient
simulation in their ZK-PCPs. We circumvent their negative results by using LR-SSSs to
protect information – instead of using LR circuits to protect computation – and apply the
LR-SSS to PCPs with ZK guarantees (whereas [25] use standard PCPs).
2.2 ZK-PCPPs with Non-Adaptive Verification and Efficient Simulation
We extend our techniques to apply to PCPs of Proximity. Specifically, our alphabet reduction
could also be applied to ZK-PCPPs, which reduces the task of designing ZK-PCPPs with
non-adaptive verification to designing such ZK-PCPPs over a large alphabet.
5 In fact, Ĉ operates on encoded inputs, however to simplify the discussion we disregard this at this point,
and provide a more accurate discussion in Section 2.2.2 below.
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2.2.1 A ZK-PCPP with Non-Adaptive Verification Over Large Alphabets
The first step is to design a ZK-PCPP over a large alphabet. We do so by presenting a
variant of the system of [21] in which the verifier does not read its entire input. Recall that
the proof in the ZK-PCP of [21] consists of the views of all parties in an execution of an
MPC protocol for the function fR (x, w1, . . . , wn) = R (x,⊕wi), where x is a common input,
and wi is the input of the ith party Pi. In particular, a single proof symbol (i.e., a single
view) reveals the entire input x. This is problematic in the context of ZK-PCPPs, in which
the proof is required to hide not only the NP-witness w, but also most of the input x, in the
sense that a verifier making few queries learns only few physical bits of x.
Thus, no single party can hold the entire input x. Instead, following [24] we introduce
m additional “input parties” (where m = |x|), such that the MPC protocol is over m + n
parties P1, . . . , Pm+n. The inputs of parties P1, . . . , Pm are x1, . . . , xm (respectively), and
the inputs of parties Pm+1, . . . , Pm+n are w1, . . . , wn (respectively). Proof generation from
this revised protocol is similar to the original construction of [21], and verification is also
similar, except that whenever the verifier queries a view of Pi, i ∈ [m], it also queries xi from
its input oracle, and checks that xi is the input of Pi reported in the view.
If the MPC protocol is q∗-private, then we are guaranteed that q∗ queries to the proof
reveal at most q∗ bits of x. Indeed, the q∗-privacy of the protocol guarantees that the views
of q∗ parties reveal no information other than their inputs (which is at most q∗ bits of x)
and their output (which is 1).
As for soundness, we show that our improved analysis (discussed in Section 2.1.1 above)
extends to PCPPs. Specifically, we show that if the MPC protocol is q∗-robust then the
resultant ZK-PCPP is sound with proximity parameter δ ≥ 1/
√
|x|, namely the verifier
rejects (with high probability) inputs that are δ-far from the language. Indeed, let x be δ-far
from L, and notice that any (possibly ill-formed) proof π∗ for x determines an effective input
x∗ for the underlying MPC protocol (x∗ is obtained by concatenating the inputs reported
in the views of P1, . . . , Pm). We show that if x∗ is δ-far from x then with overwhelming
probability the verifier will query a view on which x, x∗ differ, in which case it rejects with
probability 1. Otherwise, x∗ is δ-close to x, implying x∗ /∈ L, in which case our improved
analysis of Section 2.1.1 essentially shows that the PCPP verifier rejects with overwhelming
probability. This yields the first ZK-PCPP with non-adaptive verification and efficient
simulation, but the proof is over a large alphabet.
Combining this ZK-PCPP over a large alphabet with our alphabet reduction, we obtain
the first ZK-PCPPs over {0, 1} with non-adaptive verification. Moreover, the system has
efficient ZK simulation. Specifically, combining the ZK-PCPP over a large alphabet with
a LR-SSS gives a ZK-PCPP with ZK against non-adaptive malicious verifiers, whereas
combining it with an equivocal SSS gives a full-fledged ZK-PCPP. Instantiating the equivocal
SSS with the scheme of Section 2.3.2 gives a ZK-PCPP with the properties of Theorem 2.
Due to space limitations, the construction and analysis of our ZK-PCPP system is deferred
to the full version [20].
2.2.2 Why Do Previous Approaches of Constructing Non-Adaptive
ZK-PCPPs Fail?
We now give some intuition as to why LR-SSS is useful to obtaining ZK-PCPPs with non-
adaptive verification, whereas ZK-PCPP constructions based on leakage-resilient circuits
seem to fail. Recall that a leakage-resilient circuit operates over encoded inputs, where
leakage from some function class F on the internal wire values of the circuit reveals no
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information about the input other than the output. In particular, this implies that the input
encoding should resist leakage from F , since leakage can be applied to the input wires (which
carry the encoded inputs).
Recall that the verifier wishes to verify that (x, w) ∈ R, namely that (x, w) satisfies the
verification circuit C of R. When using leakage-resilient circuits to verify this claim, the
circuit C is replaced with its leakage-resilient variant Ĉ, which operates over encoded inputs,
where the queries of the verifier are interpreted as leakage on the wire values of Ĉ. This
raises the question of how to incorporate x into the computation. Syntactically, Ĉ cannot
operate directly on the unencoded input x, but if Ĉ operates on an encoding of x, the prover
can cheat by providing an encoding of some x∗ ≠ x. (The verifier will not be able to tell the
difference because the input encoding is resilient against leakage, namely against the verifier
queries.) The solution of [25] is to first hard-wire x into C, i.e. replace C with Cx = C (x, ·),
and then generate the leakage-resilient version Ĉx of Cx. The verifier will now verify that
Ĉx is satisfiable.
While this solves the problem for ZK-PCPs, it cannot be applied in the context of
ZK-PCPPs. Indeed, verifying that Ĉx is satisfiable requires knowing the structure of Ĉx.
This is indeed the case for ZK-PCPs, since x is known to the verifier in its entirety, so the
verifier can locally construct Ĉx. However, the ZK-PCPP verifier does not know all of x, nor
do we want it to – the advantage of ZK-PCPPs over ZK-PCPs (which is crucially exploited
by cryptographic applications of ZK-PCPPs) is that the verifier can be sublinear in the input
length, and verify the claim without learning “too much” about the input. Therefore, we
cannot hard-wire x into the verification circuit, and so it is unclear how the verifier would
verify consistency of its own input with the one used to evaluate C.
Finally, we note that even if one were to solve this issue of how to handle the input, using
leakage-resilient circuits would incur inefficient ZK simulation in the resultant ZK-PCPP,
due to the negative results of [25].
2.3 Equivocal Secret Sharing
We generalize the notion of LR-SSS [17, 12] secure against local leakage [19, 8, 1] by
introducing equivocal SSSs. We then construct a 1-party equivocal SSS based on codes with
probing-resilience. We note that while a 1-party SSS is useless as a means of sharing a secret,
its equivocation property gives a meaningful way of encoding a secret in a leakage-resilient
(in fact, equivocal) manner. In particular, such schemes suffice for constructing ZK-PCPs and
ZK-PCPPs as described in Sections 2.1 and 2.2 above. Morevoer, since 1-party schemes can
be more efficient than multi-party schemes, using 1-party schemes results in more efficient
ZK-PCPs and ZK-PCPPs.
2.3.1 Equivocal SSS: Definition
Recall that a standard t-threshold n-party SSS guarantees that the secret remains entirely
hidden given any t of the n shares. LR-SSS enhances this privacy property to hold even
given leakage on the other shares. We will focus on resisting adaptive (t, ℓ)-local probing
leakage, in which the leakage reveals t shares, as well as ℓ bits from every other share. This
can be formalized by comparing the real execution with an ideal experiment in which an
efficient simulator Sim, that has no knowledge of the secret, answers the leakage queries.
An equivocal SSS generalizes the notion of (adaptive) LR-SSS by considering a two-phase
ideal experiment, where the first phase is similar to the ideal experiment of LR-SSS. At the
end of the first phase, the adversary can choose whether to continue to the second phase.
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In the second phase, the simulator is given a secret s, and must generate an entire secret
sharing of s, which is given to the adversary. The adversary should have only a negligible
advantage in distinguishing the real execution from the ideal experiment, as long as it didn’t
violate the leakage restrictions. That is, as long as at the onset of the second phase, the
adversary obtained at most t shares, and probed at most ℓ bits from every other share.
Since the adversary can choose not to continue to the second phase of the simulation, this
notion strictly generalizes the notion of a LR-SSS. Notice that we make no restriction on the
computational power of the adversary. The definition appears in Section 3.3.
2.3.2 Equivocal SSS: Construction
We use a 1-party equivocal SSS that resists (0, ℓ)-local probing leakage [19, 8, 1], where ℓ is a
constant fraction of the share size. Considering 1-party schemes suffices for the ZK-PCP and
ZK-PCPP application, and admit lean constructions that result in more efficient ZK-PCPs
and ZK-PCPPs (in terms of query complexity and proof length).
2.3.2.1 Existing leakage-resilient encodings
A 1-party equivocal SSS gives a method of encoding data such that the resultant encoding is
equivocal, and consequently also leakage-resilient. We note that leakage-resilient encodings
have been considered before under different names. ZK codes [13, 14, 23] are encodings
that resists non adaptive probing leakage, i.e., these are 0-threshold 1-party SSSs that resist
non-adaptive probing leakage. Leakage-resilient storage [17, 12] encodes the data into two
parts that resist adaptive leakage from each part separately. Thus, leakage-resilient storage
can be though of as a ramp 2-party SSS which is private against 0 parties, reconstructible
given both shares, and resists adaptive leakage. We note that the schemes of [17, 12] resists
general local leakage (i.e., leakage which operates on each share separately, and has short
output), and not just probing. An Equivocal SSS generalizes these notions – while ZK
codes and leakage-resilient storage are only secure as long as the number of leakage bits
does not pass an a-priori bound, equivocal schemes guarantee security even beyond the
leakage threshold. Another related notion is that of a Reconstructable Probabilistic Encoding
(RPE) [10, 5, 11, 4]. Informally, these are leakage resilient encodings that are also equivocal
(with perfect leakage resilience and equivocation), with an additional error correction property.
RPEs and equivocal SSSs are incomparable: while RPEs are a strengthening of 1-party
equivocal SSS (due to their error correction), (multi-party) equivocal SSSs guarantee leakage
resilience even when full shares are leaked. In particular, they can potentially achieve a
better leakage rate.
2.3.2.2 A specific 1-party equivocal SSS construction
Our constructions will employ the ZK code of [13, 14]. Thy construct a linear code in {0, 1}n
with constant rate, and leakage resilience against a constant fraction of leaked bits. It is also
equivocal, which follows from linearity using its dual distance (see [4, Lemma 2]). Therefore,
it is a 1-party equivocal SSS with constant rate and security against probing of a constant
fraction of codeword bits.
2.3.2.3 Why do equivocal SSSs yield non-adaptive ZK-PCPs?
We note that the locking schemes used in the constructions of [26, 22, 24] posses an equivoca-
tion property which is similar to our equivocal SSS, but applying them towards constructing
ZK-PCPs and ZK-PCPPs causes the honest verifier to be adaptive. The reason is that
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reconstructing (i.e., opening) the secret in a locking scheme requires making several rounds of
queries to the locking scheme. This is because one should be able to recover the locked secret
without reading the entire lock, which is needed since locking schemes are generally much
longer than the locked secret. (The blowup is inherent to obtaining equivocation in locking
schemes.) On the other hand, in an equivocal SSS the secret is reconstructed by reading
all (or most) of the shares, which can be done non-adaptively. The fact that reconstruction
requires reading many shares is not problematic in terms of efficiency, since the total length
of all shares is usually relatively short compared to the secret.
2.4 Future Directions
Our work still leaves several open questions for future research. First, it is natural to ask
whether the query gap (between the query complexity of the malicious and honest verifiers)
in our constructions could be improved – to a better polynomial gap, or even exponential?
This could potentially be achieved by instantiating the ZK-PCP of [21] with an MPC
protocol with stringent communication requirements, in which the communication complexity
(more specifically, the size of the views) is sublinear in the number of parties. Another
natural research direction is to construct multi-party equivocal SSSs, and in particular
ones that withstand general local leakage (and not just probing leakage). Finally, it would
be interesting to find further applications of equivocal SSSs in other contexts, e.g., for
adaptively-secure MPC.
3 Preliminaries
We denote the security parameter by κ. We say that a function µ : N → N is negligible
if for every positive polynomial p(·) and all sufficiently large κ’s it holds that µ(κ) < 1p(κ) .
We denote the set of all negligible functions by negl (κ). We use the abbreviation PPT
to denote probabilistic polynomial-time, and denote by [n] the set of elements {1, . . . , n}
for some n ∈ N. For a string s of length n, and a subset I ⊆ [n], we denote by s|I the
restriction of s to the coordinates in I. For an NP relation R, we denote by Rx the set of
witnesses of x, and by LR its associated language. That is, Rx = {w | (x, w) ∈ R} and
LR = {x | ∃ w s.t. (x, w) ∈ R}.
Let δ ∈ (0, 1), let Σ be an alphabet, and let x, y be strings over Σn. We say that x, y are
δ-close if |{i : xi ̸=yi}|n < δ, otherwise we say that x, y are δ-far. We say that x is δ-close to a
language L if there exists x′ ∈ L such that x, x′ are δ-close. Otherwise, we say that x is δ-far
from L.
▶ Definition 3. Let Xκ and Yκ be random variables accepting values taken from a finite






∣∣ Pr[Xκ = w]− Pr[Yκ = w]∣∣.
We say that Xκ and Yκ are ε-close if their statistical distance is at most ε(κ). We say that
Xκ and Yκ are statistically close, denoted Xκ ≈s Yκ, if ε(κ) is negligible in κ.
We use the asymptotic notation O (·) and Ω (·). We will sometimes disregard polylogar-
ithmic factors, using Õ (n) and Ω̃ (n) to denote n · poly log n and n/poly log n ,respectively.
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3.1 Zero-Knowledge Probabilistically Checkable Proofs (PCPs) and
PCPs of Proximity
Informally, a Probabilistically Checkable Proof (PCP) system for a language L consists of a
probabilistic polynomial time prover that given x ∈ L and a corresponding witness generates
a proof for x, and a probabilistic polynomial-time verifier having direct access to individual
symbols of the proof. This proof string (called oracle) will be accessed only partially by the
verifier. The oracle queries are determined by the verifier’s input and coin tosses. Formally,
▶ Definition 4 (PCP). A Probabilistically Checkable Proof (PCP) for a language L consists
of a PPT prover P and a PPT verifier V such that the following holds for some negligible
function negl = negl (κ).
1. Syntax. The prover P has input 1κ, x, w, and outputs a proof πx for x over some
alphabet Σ. The verifier V has input 1κ, x, and oracle access to π. It makes q queries to
π, and outputs either 0 or 1 (representing reject or accept, respectively).
2. Completeness: For every x ∈ L, every w ∈ Rx, and every proof πx ∈ P (1κ, x, w),
Pr[Vπx(1κ, x) = 1] ≥ 1− negl(κ)
where the probability is over the randomness of V, and κ is the security parameter.
3. Soundness: For every x /∈ L and every oracle π∗,
Pr[Vπ
∗
(1κ, x) = 1] ≤ negl(κ)
where the probability is over the coin tosses of the verifier, and κ is a security parameter.
negl is called the soundness error of the system.
Efficiency measures of a PCP system
We associate with a PCP system the following efficiency measures: the alphabet size |Σ|, the
query complexity q, and the proof length |π|. We will call such a system a q-query PCP over
alphabet Σ. We are generally interested in obtaining PCPs with Σ = {0, 1}, in which the
proof length |π| is polynomial in |x|, and q is significantly smaller than |π|. We note that a
PCP prover is usually deterministic, but allowing for randomized provers will be useful when
discussing zero-knowledge PCPs, as we do next.
Next, we define zero-knowledge PCPs. Intuitively, these are PCPs in which the witness
remains entirely hidden throughout the verification process, even when the verifier is malicious
and can potentially make many more queries to the proof compared to the honest verifier.
We guarantee zero-knowledge against any, possibly malicious and unbounded, verifier - the
only restriction is on the number of queries the verifier makes to the proof (this restriction is
inherent to obtaining zero-knowledge). Thus, we first define the notion of a query bounded
verifier.
▶ Definition 5 (Query-bounded verifier). We say that a (possibly malicious) verifier V∗ with
oracle access to a proof π is q∗-query-bounded if it makes only q∗ queries to π.
▶ Definition 6 (Non adaptive verifier). We say that a (possibly malicious) verifier V∗ is non
adaptive if its queries are determined solely by its input x and its randomness (in particular,
V∗ can make a single round of queries to its proof oracle).
We will use the following notation. For a PCP system (P,V) and a (possibly malicious)
verifier V∗, we use ViewV∗,P (x, w) to denote the view of V∗ when it has input x and oracle
access to a proof that was randomly generated by P on input (x, w). We are now ready to
define zero-knowledge PCPs.
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▶ Definition 7 (ZK-PCP). We say that a PCP system (P,V) for L is a (q∗, ε)-Zero-Knowledge
PCP (or ZK-PCP for short) if for any (possibly malicious and adaptive) q∗-query-bounded
verifier V∗ there exists a PPT simulator Sim, such that for any (x, w) ∈ R, Sim(1κ, x) is
distributed ε-statistically close to ViewV∗,P (x, w).
If (P,V) is a (q∗, ε)-ZK-PCP for ε = negl (κ) then we simply say that (P,V) is a q∗-ZK-
PCP. If (P,V) is a (q∗, 0)-ZK-PCP then we say it is a perfect q∗-ZK-PCP. If the ZK property
of the system only holds against PPT verifiers V∗ then we say the system is a computational
(q∗, ε)-ZK-PCP (or CZK-PCP for short). If the zero-knowledge property is only guaranteed
against non-adaptive verifiers then we say the system is a ZK-PCP for non-adaptive verifiers.
If the honest ZK-PCP verifier is non-adaptive then we say that (P,V) is a non-adaptive
ZK-PCP.
We stress that having a non-adaptive honest verifier is a desirable feature of the system,
whereas having ZK against non-adaptive verifiers is a weaker form of ZK (since the system
has no guarantee against malicious adaptive verifiers).
We remark that although this definition requires a weaker notion with a non-universal
simulator, all our constructions obtain the stronger notion with a universal simulator.
Furthermore, our constructions will rely on the MPC-in-the-head approach, where the quality
of ZK will be inherited from the level of security of the underlying MPC protocol employed
by the construction.
3.2 Leakage-Resilient Secret Sharing Schemes (LR-SSS)
A Secret-Sharing Scheme (SSS) allows a dealer to distribute a secret among n parties.
Specifically, during a sharing phase each party receives a share from the dealer, and the secret
can then be recovered from the shares during a reconstruction phase. The scheme is associated
with an access structure which defines subsets of authorized and unauthorized parties, where
every authorized set can recover the secret from its shares, whereas unauthorized sets learn
nothing about the secret even given all their shares. A Leakage-Resilient SSS (LR-SSS)
guarantees this latter property holds even if the unauthorized set obtains some leakage on
the other shares.
We will mainly be interested in t-threshold secret sharing schemes, in which all (and only)
subsets of size at least t + 1 are authorized to reconstruct the secret. We first define secret
sharing schemes.
▶ Definition 8 (Secret Sharing Scheme). An n-party Secret Sharing Scheme (SSS) for secrets
in S consists of the following pair of algorithms.
Sharing algorithm Share: Takes as input a secret s ∈ S and outputs shares (s1, · · · , sn) ∈
S1 × · · · × Sn, where si is called the share of party i, and Si is the domain of shares of
party i.
Reconstruction algorithm Reconst: Takes as input a description G of an authorized set,
and shares {si : i ∈ G} and outputs s′ ∈ S.
The scheme is required to satisfy the following properties:
Correctness: For every s ∈ S, and every authorized set G,
Pr [Reconst (G, Share (s) |G) = s] = 1
where Share (s) |G denotes the shares of the parties in the authorized set G.
Secrecy: For any pair of secrets s, s′ ∈ S, and any unauthorized set G, Share (s) |G and
Share (s′) |G are statistically close.
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In our constructions, we will use Shamir’s secret sharing scheme [28], which we review next.
▶ Definition 9 (Shamir’s SSS). Let F be a field.
Sharing algorithm: For any input s ∈ F, pick a random polynomial p(·) of degree t in the
polynomial-field F[x] with the condition that p(0) = s, and output p(1), . . . , p(n).
Reconstruction algorithm: For any input (s′i)i∈S where none of the s′i are ⊥ and |S| > t,
compute a polynomial g(x) such that g(i) = s′i for every i ∈ S. This is possible using










Finally the reconstruction algorithm outputs g(0).
We will actually require a stronger correctness property for SSSs which, informally,
guarantees unique reconstruction for any set of (possibly ill-formed) shares. This can be
thought of as a weak form of unique decoding, where we only require error detection (i.e.,
identifying whether or not an error occurred), and not error correction. Alternatively, this is
a weaker form of verifiable secret sharing, which need only be secure against a corrupted
dealer (i.e., all the share holders are assumed to be honest). Formally,
▶ Definition 10 (Strongly-correct SSS). We say that an n-party secret sharing scheme
(Share, Reconst) for secrets in S is strongly correct if Reconst is deterministic, and the only
authorized set is [n] (the set of all parties).
We note that for any t < n, t-out-of-n Shamir’s scheme (with the access structure in
which the only authorized set is [n]) is strongly correct. For this, we assume that the shares
are numbered in some arbitrary way, and reconstruction always uses the “first” t + 1 shares,
see Remark 11 below.
▶ Remark 11 (Strong correctness implies unique reconstruction in threshold schemes). The strong
correctness property of Definition 10 implies unique reconstruction in threshold schemes,
when these are thought of as ramp secret sharing schemes which are private for sets of size
at most t, and reconstructible for the set of all parties. Indeed, we assume without loss
of generality that the shares are numbered (in some arbitrary way). Given all n shares,
reconstruction is performed with the first t + 1 shares. These t + 1 shares determine some
secret, and the fact that Reconst is deterministic guarantees its uniqueness. In particular, we
note that in this case Shamir’s secret sharing scheme has unique reconstruction.
▶ Remark 12. We note that for our alphabet reduction for ZK-PCPs (Construction 17,
Section 4) and ZK-PCPPs (which appears in the full version [20]) we can make due with any
SSS with deterministic reconstruction, by having the verifier use some arbitrary fixed minimal
authorized set for reconstruction. Notice that if such a set can be efficiently found then the
verifier in Construction 17 will be PPT. We further note that for threshold SSSs (such as the
one used in our final constructions in Theorems 1 and 2), such a minimal authorized set can
be found efficiently.
Next, we define leakage-resilient SSS.
▶ Definition 13 (Leakage-resilient SSS). We say that a secret sharing scheme (Share, Reconst)
for S is ε-leakage resilient against a family F of leakage functions if for every f ∈ F , and
every pair of secrets s, s′ ∈ S, f (Share (s)) and f (Share (s′)) are ε-statistically close.
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We will be particularly interested in the local probing leakage family, which consists of all
functions that, given the n shares, output the shares of an unauthorized set in their entirety,
as well as ℓ bits from each of the other shares. More specifically, we will only consider the
t + 1-threshold access structure mentioned above, in which all (and only) subsets of size
≥ t + 1 are authorized. Formally:
▶ Definition 14 ((t, ℓ)-local probing leakage). Let S1 ×S2 × · · · × Sn be the domain of shares
for some secret sharing scheme. For a subset G ⊆ [n] and a sequence (I1, . . . , In) of subsets of
[n], the function fG,I1,...,In on input (s1, . . . , sn) outputs si for every i ∈ G, and outputs si|Ii
for every i /∈ G. The (t, ℓ)-local probing function family corresponding to S1 × S2 × · · · × Sn
is defined as follows:
Ft,ℓ = {fG,I1,...,In : G ⊆ [n], |G| ≤ t, ∀i /∈ G, |Ii| ≤ ℓ} .
3.3 Equivocal Secret Sharing
In this section we define the notion of equivocal secret sharing, compare it to leakage-resilient
secret sharing, and present a 1-party equivocal SSS based on coding. We start with the
definition.
At a high level, an equivocal SSS is a leakage-resilient SSS with the additional guarantee
that even after some bits are leaked from the shares, one can still “open” the secret (by
providing the entire secret sharing) consistently with the previous leakage. This is formalized
(in Definition 15) in the simulation-based paradigm, by comparing the real world experiment
with an ideal experiment, which are described in Figure 1.
The real and ideal experiments have two phases: a leakage phase and a guessing phase.
This is captures by having the adversary and simulator consist of two separate algorithms
(A1,A2) and (Sim1, Sim2), respectively. Leakage resilience is guaranteed against a family F
of leakage functions and a leakage bound ℓ.
In the real world, the secret s is secret shared into n shares Sh1, . . . , Shn. The adversary
A1 is then given oracle access to a SHARE oracle, and a LEAK oracle. The Share oracle,
given an index i, returns the i’th share Shi. Each call to SHARE updates the set T of secret
shares which the adversary has queried so far, by adding i to T (T is initialized to ∅). The
LEAK oracle takes as input a function g ∈ F , which specifies, for each share Shi, i /∈ T , a
leakage function gi. It applies these leakage functions to the shares Shi, i /∈ T , and returns
the outputs outputi. For each such share Shi, i /∈ T , it also updates the counter ℓi of the
number of leakage bits obtained on Shi, by increasing it by |outputi|. T and ℓ1, . . . , ℓn are
treated as global parameters that can be accessed and updated by all oracles.
At the end of the first phase of the experiment (the adversary A1 decides when to end
the first phase and move to the second phase), A1 outputs a bit bR, which specifies whether
it wishes to learn the entire secret sharing of s. If bR = 1, i.e., the adversary chose to proceed
to the second phase, then it learns the entire secret sharing of s (this is done by calling the
REVEAL oracle). Otherwise, the adversary obtains no further information beyond what it
obtained during the leakage phase.
At the second phase of the game, the adversary A2 outputs a guess b′R as to whether
it is in the real or ideal experiments. This guess depends on the leakage in the first phase
of the game, and can either depend on the secret shares of s (if bR = 1) or not (if bR = 0).
The adversarial guess is only taken into account if the adversary did not violate the leakage
restrictions, i.e., only if the following two conditions are satisfied. First, the set T of shares
which the adversary received throughout the experiments (through SHARE queries) is an
unauthorized set. Second, for every share i, the number of bits ℓi leaked from Shi (through
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LEAK queries) does not exceed the leakage bound ℓ. These checks are performed by calling
the VALID oracle, where if the tests fail then the adversary automatically looses the game
(by setting its “guess” to 0).
The ideal experiment is similar to the real experiment, except that the SHARE ,LEAK,
and REVEAL oracles are emulated by the simulator. In particular, the simulator needs to
simulate shares and leakage on shares (through the SHARE and LEAK oracles). Additionally,
if bI = 1 (i.e., the adversary chose to learn the entire secret sharing in the ideal experiment)
then the simulator is given the secret s, and needs to emulate the entire secret sharing of s
consistently with the previous leakage (this is done in the REVEAL oracle).
We note that by allowing the adversary to choose not to receive the entire secret sharing
of s at the end of the first phase, we capture leakage-resilient secret sharing as a special case
of equivocal secret sharing. Indeed, if the adversary chooses not to learn the secret sharing,
then the simulator is only required to adaptively simulate the leakage (with no knowledge of
the secret). We elaborate more on this in Remark 16 below.
▶ Definition 15 (Equivocal SSS). We say that an n-party secret sharing scheme
(Share, Reconst) for secrets in S is ε (n)-equivocal for leakage class F , leakage bound ℓ
and access structure Acc if for every adversary (A1,A2) there exists an efficient simulator
(Sim1, Sim2) and a negligible function ε (n) such that for every s ∈ S,
|Pr [REALF,ℓ,Acc (s) = 1]− Pr [IDEALF,ℓ,Acc (s) = 1]| ≤ ε (n)
where REALF,ℓ,Acc (s) , IDEALF,ℓ,Acc (s) are defined in Figure 1, and the probability is over
the random coin tosses of SET UPR, (A1,A2) and (Sim1, Sim2).
We say that the scheme is perfectly equivocal, if it is ε-equivocal with ε = 0.
▶ Remark 16 (On the connection between equivocal and LR secret sharing). We note that
equivocal secret sharing captures LR secret sharing as a special case, in the following sense.
If a t-threshold secret sharing scheme is ε-equivocal with leakage bound ℓ, then it is also
2ε-leakage resilient against (t, ℓ)-local probing leakage. Indeed, if the REVEAL oracle is not
called in Figure 1 (which happens when b = 0) then the simulator never receives the secret s,
in which case the simulated answers to the leakage queries are required to be distributed
ε-statistically close to the real execution. As this holds for any secret, the real leakage on
the shares of two different secrets must be 2ε-statistically close.
4 Alphabet Reduction for ZK-PCPs
In this section we describe a reduction for ZK-PCPs over any alphabet Σ into a ZK-PCP
over {0, 1}. In particular, this reduction preserves the zero-knowledge property. We note
that for standard (non-ZK) PCPs, one can easily transform a PCP over any alphabet Σ into
a PCP over {0, 1} by simply representing every symbol of Σ as a binary string. However,
this reduction does not preserve zero-knowledge since a malicious verifier given access to the
binary proof can read “parts” of symbols of the original proof, and thus potentially violate
the zero-knowledge guarantee of the underlying ZK-PCP over Σ (which only guarantees
zero-knowledge when most symbols are not accessed at all).
We begin by describing a general reduction, then instantiate it to obtain ZK-PCPs over
{0, 1} with a square root gap.
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SET UPR (s):
pick a uniformly random string
r for Share
(Sh1, . . . , Shn)← Share (s; r)
output (Sh1, . . . , Shn)
SHARER (s, r, i):
T1 ← T1 ∪ {i}
output Shi
LEAKR (s, r, g, T ):





T1 ← T1 ∪ T
for every i /∈ T






output (Sh1, . . . , Shn)
VALID (ℓ, Acc):









Shi ← Sim1 (St, i)
T1 ← T1 ∪ {i}
output Shi
LEAKI (g, T ):
if g /∈ F then return
run Sim (St, g, T ) to obtain(
(outputi)i/∈T , (Shi)i∈T , St
)
T1 ← T1 ∪ T
for every i /∈ T






rev← Sim2 (St, s)
output rev
REALF,ℓ,Acc (s):
ℓ1, . . . , ℓn ← 0
T1 ← ∅




if bR = 1 then(




← REVEALR (s, r)
StA ← StA ◦
(




b′R ← A2 (StA)
if VALID (ℓ, Acc) then output b′R
else output 0
IDEALF,ℓ,Acc (s):
ℓ1, . . . , ℓn ← 0
T1 ← ∅




if bI = 1 then
output← REVEALI (s)
StA ← StA ◦ output
b′I ← A2 (StA)
if VALID (ℓ, Acc) then output b′I
else output 0
Figure 1 The Security Experiments of Equivocal SSS.
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A General Transformation
Our starting point is the trivial transformation described above, in which every proof symbol
is replaced with a corresponding bit-string. As discussed above, this alone does not guarantee
zero-knowledge since a malicious verifier may read parts of symbols of the original proof. The
high-level idea of preventing such malicious strategies from leaking additional information is
to “protect” each bit-string by secret-sharing it (equivalently, encoding it) using a leakage-
resilient secret sharing scheme (equivalently, leakage-resilient encoding). Recall that, very
roughly, a probing-resilient secret sharing scheme hides the secret from an adversary that sees
several secret shares, and can probe few bits in each of the other shares. The zero-knowledge
property of the new PCP system now follows from a combination of leakage-resilience and
the zero-knowledge property of the original ZK-PCP. To see why, given a malicious query-
bounded verifier V∗, we partition the symbols of the original proof into two groups, based
on the number of bits V∗ reads from the secret-sharing of the bit-string representing the
symbol. Since V∗ is query-bounded, there are only few symbols from whose secret shares V∗
can read many bits (having many such symbols would have violated the query bound). The
zero-knowledge property of the original ZK-PCP system guarantees that V∗ learns nothing
about the witness even if it is given all these symbols in their entirety. For the rest of the
symbols, since V∗ reads only few bits from their secret shares, the leakage-resilience of the
secret sharing scheme guarantees that the secret shared symbol remains entirely hidden. The
actual analysis is slightly more involved, see the proof of Theorem 18 below for details.
We now formally describe the transformation.
▶ Construction 17 (Alphabet reduction for ZK-PCPs). Let κ be a security parameter. The
system (P ′,V ′) is over alphabet {0, 1}.
Building blocks:
A PCP system (P,V) over alphabet Σ of size |Σ| = 2m.
A strongly-correct secret sharing scheme (Share, Reconst) for secrets in {0, 1}m.
Prover algorithm. P ′ has input 1κ, x, w. It runs P with input 1κ, x, w to obtain a proof
π over Σ. For every proof symbol σ, it uses Share to secret-share the bit-representation of σ.
(That is, the length-m bit representation of σ is treated as the secret.) Then, P ′ outputs the
concatenation of all secret shares. We denote the proof generated by P ′ by π′.
Verifier algorithm. V ′ is given input 1κ, x and oracle access to π′. It runs V with input
1κ, x, and emulates the oracle π for V as follows. Whenever V reads a symbol σ from π, V ′
reads the entire secret sharing of σ from π′. Then, it uses Reconst to recover the symbol σ,
and provides σ to V as the answer of the oracle.
The following theorem summarizes the properties of Construction 17. Its proof, and
several relevant corollaries, can be found in the full version [20].
▶ Theorem 18 (Non-adaptive ZK-PCPs for non-adaptive verifiers). Assume Construction 17
is instantiated with:
A non-adaptive q-query (q∗, ϵ)-ZK-PCP (P,V) over alphabet Σ for a language L, with
proofs of length N .6
A strongly-correct k-party secret sharing scheme (Share, Reconst) for secrets in {0, 1}m
with secret shares in {0, 1}M which is ϵ′-leakage-resilient against (t, ℓ)-local probing leakage.
6 In fact, as will be evident from the proof, it suffices that (P, V) is ZK against non-adaptive malicious
verifiers.
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Then Construction 17 is a non-adaptive q′-query (q∗∗, ϵ′′)-ZK-PCP for non-adaptive verifiers,
where:
q′ = q ·M · k q∗∗ = (q∗ + 1) (ℓ + 1) (t + 1)− 1 ϵ′′ = ϵ + ϵ′ · (N − q∗) .
Moreover, the transformation preserves the soundness and completeness of (P,V).
4.1 Upgrading to ZK Against Adaptive Verifiers
Our ZK-PCP (Theorem 18) obtained through the alphabet reduction of Construction 17 can
be verified non-adaptively, but guarantee ZK only against non-adaptive verifiers. Ideally, we
would like a ZK-PCP which can be verified non-adaptively, but guarantees ZK even against
adaptive malicious verifiers.
In this section, we show that when Construction 17 is instantiated with an equivocal SSS
(see Definition 15) instead of a leakage-resilient SSS then the resultant ZK-PCP retains its
ZK even when the malicious verifier is adaptive. Concretely, we prove the following:
▶ Theorem 19. Assume Construction 17 is instantiated with:
A non-adaptive q-query (q∗, ϵ)-ZK-PCP (P,V) over alphabet Σ for a language L, with
proofs of length N .7
A strongly-correct k-party ϵ′-equivocal (ramp) secret sharing scheme against (t, ℓ)-local
probing leakage, for secrets in {0, 1}m with secret shares in {0, 1}M .
Then Construction 17 is a non-adaptive q′-query (q∗∗, ϵ′′)-ZK-PCP, where
q′ = q ·M · k q∗∗ = (q∗ + 1) (ℓ + 1) (t + 1)− 1 ϵ′′ = ϵ + ϵ′ ·N.
Moreover, the transformation preserves the soundness and completeness of (P,V).
Theorem 1 now follows from Theorem 19 by an appropriate instantiation of the building
blocks. See the full version [20] for details.
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